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THE TUNA EXAMPLE: IS THERE HOPE FOR
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION?
The preservation of the limited resources of the high seas should
be of tantamount concern for all nations. In part, the need for con-
servation measures to assure the preservation of the yellowfin and
skipjack tuna within the eastern Pacific Ocean prompted the
governments of Costa Rica and the United States to establish the
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission1 (hereinafter referred to
as either the Commission or the IATTC). The difficulties en-
countered in the administration of its suggested conservation meas-
ures were recently brought forth by the filing of American Tuna-
boat Association v. Dent,2 in the District Court for the Southern
District of California. Indirectly, the plaintiffs in this action are
seeking equal enforcement of the conservation recommendations of
the IATTC by all the signatory nations. Those nations which have
ratified the Convention have, by the act of signing, agreed to enact
such legislation as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of the
IATTC.3
A thorough analysis of the Commission, its history, purposes, and
ensuing legislation will be presented in order to lay the foundation
for a discussion of the problems of the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission and some suggestions for solving them.
1. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission with Costa Rica done at
Washington, May 31, 1949, [1950], 1 U.S.T. 230; T.I.A.S. No. 2044 [herein-
after cited as IATTC].
2. American Tunaboat Association v. Dent (S.D. Calif. Case No. 73-
299, filed July 26, 1973). This action was initiated by the following plain-
tiffs named in their respective capacities: American Tunaboat Association,
a nonprofit California corporation; International Tuna Association, a non-
profit California corporation; and, Ocean Fisheries, a Delaware corporation.
The following people were named as individual defendants rather than in
their respective capacities: Frederick B. Dent, Secretary of Commerce;
Robert White, Acting Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration; Robert Schoning, Acting Director of the National
Marine Fisheries Service; Gerald Howard, Regional Director of the Pacific
Southwest Region of the National Marine Fisheries Service; Cluster R.
Bender, Commandant of the United States Cost Guard; and, Vernon Acree,
Commissioner of Customs.
3. IATTC, supra note 1, art. III, at 238.
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THE IATTC, ITS HISTORY AND PURPOsES
A. History
The establishment of the IATTC was the by-product of the com-
bination of several developments, two of the more important of
which were overfishing and territorial expansion. Rapid growth
of the fishing industry immediately following World War II created
concern over the rate at which both tuna and baitfish were being
exploited. The exploitation was especially evident in the Gulf of
Nicaya, Costa Rica. This gulf, once abundant with desirable bait-
fish such as the anchoveta, was nearly depleted after a few years of
overfishing.4 The expansion of territorial boundaries by certain
Central and South American nations was a second major develop-
ment which led to the formation of the Commission. Many mari-
time experts view the Declaration of Santiago5 as the initial expan-
sion of territorial boundaries, but it should be noted that the trend
for such expansion was established shortly after the Truman Proc-
lamations of 1945. The first of these proclamations stated that
".. . recognized jurisdiction over these resources [of the subsoil
and sea bed of the continental shelf] is required in the interest of
their conservation and prudent utilization . . . ."6 In the second
proclamation, while referring to the destructive exploitation of the
coastal fishery resources, President Truman stated that each coun-
try had the right to establish conservation zones off its own
shores.1 Nations such as Mexico, Argentina, Chile, Peru and Costa
Rica utilized these proclamations as a basis for their unilateral dec-
larations of territorial and sovereign expansion over vast ocean
4. Clifford L. Peterson, The Physical Oceanography of the Gulf of Nic-
oya, Costa Rica, A Tropical Estuary, 4 IATTC Bulletin (No. 4) 139 (1960).
See also Memorandum to H.R. Comm. on Merchant Marine Fisheries, April
24, 1973, D at 2, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973).
5. Declaration of Maritime Zone, issued in Santiago de Chile on Au-
gust 18, 1952 and subscribed by Chile, Ecuador and Peru, in which the
three nations claimed, among other things, to have exclusive sovereignty
and jurisdiction over a minimum territory of 200 miles from their respec-
tive coasts.
6. Proc. No. 2667, Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natu-
ral Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 3 C.F.R.
§ 67; 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1945).
7. Proc. No. 2668, Policy of the United States With Respect to Coastal
Fisheries in Certain Areas of the High Seas, 10 Fed. Reg. 12304 (1945).
areas and the resources located therein, including the migratory
marine resources such as the yellowfin and skipjack tuna.8
The culmination of these developments was that on May 31, 1949,
in Washington, D.C., the United States and Costa Rica became the
original signatories of the Convention for the Establishment of an
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission. The Convention was
ratified by the President of the United States of America on Sep-
tember 1, 1949, and by Costa Rica on December 23, 1949, and was
entered into force on March 3, 1950.9
It is believed by some' 0 that the United States and Costa Rica
were the original signatories to this Convention because of the prob-
lems in the Gulf of Nicoyal" and because Costa Rica was then at-
tempting to claim a 200 mile resource limit' 2 which, because of its
location, would have been detrimental to United States tuna in-
terests.' 3 The establishment of the IATTC was meant to prevent
the exploitation of tuna and baitfish that was feared by Costa
Rica while protecting the American tuna fishing interest and the
flow of dollars that necessarily accompanied such interest.
Since 1949, other nations whose nationals participate in the fish-
ery under the control of the IATTC have joined this Commission. 14
Panama, Ecuador, Mexico, Canada, Japan, France and Nicaragua
have so joined.' 5 These nations, with the exception of Ecuador
8. Mexico- The Declaration of President Avila Camacho, Oct.
29, 1945;
Argentina- Decree of the President of Argentina, Decree
No. 14.708 of Oct. 11, 1946, Boletin Official Dec.
5, 1946, which was a restatement of the Decree of
the President of Argentina, Decree No. 1.386 of
Jan. 24, 1944, Boletin Official March 17, 1944;
Chile- Declaration of the President of Chile, June 23,
1947;
Peru- Declaration of the President of Peru, Aug. 1,
1947;
Costa Rica- Declaration of Extension of Territorial Waters,
July 29, 1948;
See also J.J. Santa-Pinter, Latin American Countries Facing the Problem
of Territorial Waters, 8 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 606 (1971).
9. IATTC, supra note 1.
10. An IATTC source desiring to remain anonymous revealed that such
was the belief clandestinely espoused to him by John L. Kast, a former
Director of Investigations for the IATTC.
11. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
12. See note 8 supra.
13. See app. figures 3-6 infra.
14. IATTC, supra note 1, art. v, f 3, at 239, sets forth the Procedure
for becoming a member of the IATTC. First the interested nation must
make an application and then be accepted by receiving unanimous consent
of the then current members of the Commission.
15. Panama became a member in 1953, Mexico in 1964, Canada in 1968,
Japan in 1970, France and Nicaragua in 1973.
[VOL. 11: 776, 1974] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
(which officially denounced the Convention effective August 21,
1968)1 6 have annually reaffirmed their connitment to effective
regulation by their agreement at the Annual Intergovernmental
Conference on the Conservation of Yellowfish Tuna held in con-
junction with the Annual Meetings of the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission. ' Any other nation whose nationals fish for
tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean is encouraged to join the IATTC.' s
Those non-member nations who profess an interest in the IATTC
may be represented at the Commission's meeting by non-voting ob-
servers.1 9 Spain and the Netherlands are the two nations which
have most recently manifested an interest in applying for mem-
bership. This interest is stimulated (at least in part) by their
expanding roles in the international tuna industry" and their re-
sulting concern for the conservation of the species. The current
interest in the IATTC might also be motivated by the realization
that United States foreign assistance could be conditioned on for-
eign compliance with international agreements on enforcement of
conservation and fisheries rights.
21
16. 1968 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Ann. Rep. 47 (1969).
[Henceforth all citings to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
Annual Reports will be - IATTC Ann. Rep. - (-).]
17. It was revealed to the author of this article by a reliable source
within the IATTC that the Annual Meeting of the IATTC is used to eluci-
date upon scientific matters such as the abundance of tuna while the
Annual Intergovernmental Conference determines political questions such
as special allotments. It was further revealed that at the present time
the scientific information plays only a small part (10-20%) in the final
determination of IATTC recommendations, i.e., the IATTC is a scientific
organization under political control.
18. IATTC, supra note 1, art. v, 3, at 239.
19. 1970 IATTC Ann. Rep. 47 (1971).
20. Based on a comparison of the statistics on the number of vessels
and total carrying capacity listed in the September-October 1973 Bi-Month-
ly Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Report, at 5, to previous Bi-
Monthly and Annual IATTC Reports. [Henceforth all Bi-Monthly Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission Reports will be cited - Bi-Monthly
IATTC Rep. - (-).]
21. Such a method of reprisal has not been implemented in the past,
however implementation was recently suggested by the National Advisory
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere in their Second Annual Report to
the President and the Congress at 43, issued on June 29, 1973, in Washing-
ton, D.C. Statutory support for such action is supplied in part by 22 U.S.C.
§§ 1971-1978 (1972). See also FISEMMEN'S PROTECTIVE AcT or 1967, as
amended, Pub. L. No. 92-569, § 3, 8G Stat. 1182 (1972), a portion of which
provides for penalties for those who import fish goods from nations in
B. Purpose
Those nations which have joined the IATTC have thereby agreed
to call for the regulation of fishing in order to achieve a rational
utilization, a higher economic output and the conservation and
protection of the species.22 The establishment of the IATTC thus
originally represented not only the initial application of the prin-
ciples of the Presidential Proclamation of September 28, 1945, con-
cerning the policy of the United States with respect to the conserva-
tion of coastal fisheries in certain areas of the high seas;23 it -also
represented a method by which Costa Rica, and perhaps other
countries, could be persuaded to exchange a system of unilateral
and exclusive control over an ocean area, and particularly the living
resources therein, for a system of bilateral or multilateral con-
trol. Insofar as some nations still claim extended boundaries, the
IATTC has only been partially successful in achieving this latter
goal.
For over twenty years, in concert with its other duties, the
IATTC's paramount function has been to sustain mutual interest
and cooperation in the gathering and interpretation of factual in-
formation concerning the
abundance, biology, biometry, and ecology of yellowfin (Neo-
thunnus) and skipjack (Katsuwonus) tuna in the waters of the
eastern Pacific Ocean fished by the nationals of the High Con-
tracting Parties .... 24
Studies of migrations, population structure, growth, and mortality
rates (both natural and by fishing) are accomplished by utilizing
the data provided by a tuna tagging program.25
violation of a multi-lateral agreement to which the United States is a sig-
natory, the purpose of which is to conserve or protect the living resources
of the sea.
22. IATTC, supra note 1, preamble.
23. S. Rep. No. 2094, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950); (to accompany S.2633,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. [1950]); See also 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Service, 3611.
24. IATTC, supra note 1, art. II, at 236-238.
25. Tuna tagging is accomplished by placing either a combination dart
and loop-type tag or two dart tags on the second dorsal fin. See 1963
IATTC Ann. Rep. 12 (1964). The tuna tagging program is considered crit-
ical by the scientific staff of the IATTC and has been conducted since
1955. In the years 1964 through 1968 little or no tagging was accomplished.
See 1964 IATTC Ann. Rep. 24 (1965); 1965 IATTC Ann. Rep. 24 (1966);
1966 IATTC Ann. Rep. 30 (1967); 1967 IATTC Ann. Rep. 35 (1968); and
1968 IATTC Ann. Rep. 26 (1969).
This insufficient tagging was the result of the limited economic resources
received by the IATTC. The funding of the IATTC is determined by each
nation's catch from the previous year. The United States lands most of
the tuna within the IATTC's controlled area and is thus obligated to pay
a proportionate amount of the IATTC's expenses. From the amount re-
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C. The Quota System
1. History of the Quota System
Recently, the key fuction of the Commission has been to deter-
ceived from the United States the other member nations' proportionate ob-
ligations are determined. For an enlightening view of not only why the
IATTC's funding is so minimal but also an enlightening view of Mr. John
J. Rooney, Chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on
Appropriations, the author of this article has selected the following excerpt
from H.R. Sub Comm. on Appropriations, Depts. of State, Justice and Com-
merce, The Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1970, Part
2, Dept. of State March 25, 1969, 690-720, at 720, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
Mr. Rooney. Throughout the years of Roosevelt and Truman I
thought that surely the Republican Members of the House would
never continue the investigation of the lovelife of the tuna, but
strangely they did.
Then at the end of the Eisenhower administration the business
was continued in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.
Now here we are, you representing President Nixon, to further
investigate the lovelife of the tuna. I guess it is here with us to
stay; is it not?
Mr. McKernan. Well, it will be if my recommendations are taken
because it is in both our economic as well as our international in-
terest to maintain these resources.
Mr. Rooney. It would not be if my recommendations were taken
because my recommendations would do away with that law which
provides that the general American taxpayer has to pay the fines
for people who go interfering with foreign governments in South
America and also the expenses of the investigation of the lovelife
of the tuna, so there we go.
Mr. McKernan. These investigations are not designed to study the
lovelife of the tuna but to maintain these populations at very high
levels of production.
Mr. Rooney. If you do not study the lovelife how are you going
to get into that subject?
Mr. McKernan. The lovelife is a very incidental detail-
Mr. Rooney. Is it the propagation of the tuna fish?
Mr. McKernan. To some extent we are studying the natural propa-
gation of fish.
We get about $50 million at the fishermen's level, $50 million
worth of tuna, perhaps up to $55 million each year, and we are
putting about a half million dollars into this particular investiga-
tion. Economically, it is perhaps the best investment that we are
making in the international fishery field.
From the standpoint of our international affairs where we have
so much difficulty with maintaining freedom of the seas, with
maintaining the rights of our vessels in the seas, we are also doing
pretty well.
During the period of 1969 to present, tagging has received increased em-
phasis. This is due to the experimental overfishing program and the
greatly increased fishing intensity of 500 to 1500 miles offshore creating
the consequent need to know more about the extent of mixing among the
fish of different inshore and offshore areas. See 1969 IATTC Ann. Rep.
mine and recommend such conservation measures as may be nec-
essary to maintain the populations of fish covered by the conven-
tion "at those levels of abundance which will permit the maximum
sustained catch."20
A change in the abundance of stock due to exploitation became
apparent in the early 1960's. The result had been the driving down
of the stocks of yellowfin tuna well below the optimum level.
In 1961, in keeping with its functions, the scientific staff of the
IATTC, recognizing this overfishing, recommended to the member
governments of the Commission that a catch quota be established
26 (1970); 1970 IATTC Ann. Rep. 26 (1971); 1971 IATTC Ann. Rep. 22
(1972); 1972 IATTC Ann. Rep. 40 (1973); Sept.-Oct. 1973 Bi-Monthly
IATTC Rep. 7 (1973).
From the data received from this tagging program the IATTC has been
able to chart the migratory movements and locations of the yellowfin and
skipjack tuna. See 1971 IATTC Internal Rep. No. 6, Table 7 (1971); see
also app. figs. 3-6. These patterns have revealed that during the season
of unrestricted fishing the 200 mile limit off the coasts of Ecuador and
Peru is of little importance to tuna fishermen since the vast majority of
the stock and consequently the fishing, is off the coasts of the Central
American countries. During the closed season, when the incidental catch
restrictions are in force, the enlarged boundaries become important due
to the southern migration of the tuna and the spawning near the coasts.
According to the San Diego Union, July 16, 1973, at B1, coL 1, Mexico
is also contemplating expanding its boundaries. If Mexico should do this
the fishermen would either be forced to purchase permits, subject them-
selves to fines, or forego this most favored fishing area. In any case of
expansion by Mexico the practical result would be the raising of revenue
for that nation but the international result is directly contra to the interests
of the IATTC.
26. IATTC, supra note 1, art. II, 5, at 237. By maximum sustained
catch or yield it is meant, that tonnage of yellowfin tuna which the stock
is capable of having removed during the year without adversely affecting
the abundance of stock for the subsequent years. To determine both the
maximum sustainable yield and the effect that fishing has upon the stocks
of tunas comprising the fishery in the eastern Pacific Ocean (see app. fig.
1), it is of fundamental importance to have some indicia of variations of
their abundance in time and space. The Commission utilizes data of the
catch per standard day's fishing to measure the apparent abundance of
tuna and to determine the maximum sustainable yield. The data used
in these computations comes from the logbook records of the vessels oper-
ating in the eastern Pacific. Through its early efforts the Commission ob-
tained statistics of catch and effort for the yellowfin and skipjack tuna
in this region going back as far as 1934. The older statistics are used
to compare with the current statistics to see if there has been a real change
in the abundance of stock. This determination is of utmost importance
since if the changes are real, estimates of the maximum sustainable yield
from the yellowfin stock would change. See Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission Background Paper No. 2, at 2, presented at the 29th Meeting
of the IATTC held in Washington, D.C., November 12-14, 1973 (1973).
[Henceforth all citings to the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission's
Background Papers will be - IATTC Background Paper No. , at( ).]
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designed not only to halt the decline but to start some stock restora-
tion.2 7 This general overall annual catch quota for the area under
control 28 was to be taken on a competitive "first-come, first-served"
basis by all vessels wishing to participate in the fishery. Annually 29
the scientific staff recommended implementation of such a quota
but the governments at the Annual Intergovernmental Confer-
ences" felt that it was not practical for all member countries fish-
ing in the Commission's proposed regulatory area3 l to adopt ap-
propriate legislation to carry out the Commission's recommenda-
tions. This was despite the fact that within the Convention itself,
the governments of the member nations had " . . . agreed to enact
such legislation as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of
the Convention.13 2 In 1966,33 the fishery for yellowfin tuna came
under the management of the IATTC. A quota was adopted with
similar provisions to those recommended in the previous years.
Included were provisions that when the catch approached the quota,
the Director of Investigations should recommend a closure date.
This closure date would constitute the end of the open season and
would thus mark the end of that year's unrestricted fishing within
the controlled area. It was recognized that mixed-species schools
occur and that during the closed season it was unavoidable to inci-
dentally capture some yellowfin tuna while fishing for other spec-
ies. From earlier studies on mixed-species schools by the IATTC,
it was concluded that an incidental yellowfin catch allowance of
fifteen percent should be permitted during the closed season.34
The open season quota and closed season fifteen percent indi-
27. Such a resolution was adopted by the Commission on May 17, 1962,
at its 15th Meeting held in Quito, Ecuador on May 16-18, 1962.
28. Infra at 784; see also app. fig. 1.
29. See 1963 IATTC Ann. Rep. 32 (1964) recommending a quota of
81,000 tons; 1964 IATTC Ann. Rep. 16 (1965) recommending a quota of
77,000 tons; 1965 IATTC Ann. Rep. 40 (1966) recommending a quota of
81,800 tons.
30. The failure of the governments to act is in itself substantiation of
what was stated in note 17, supra.
31. I',fra at 784; see also app. fig. 1.
32. IATTC, supra note 1, art. III at 238.
33. 1966 IATTC Ann. Rep. 51 (1967); see also 31 Fed. Reg. 11938 (1966).
34. These incidental catch limitations established in 1966 did create one
undesirable effect, namely the wasteful dumping of yellowfin tuna taken
in excess of such limitations. A committee was established in 1970 to
study this problem and have reported annually since. See 1973 IATTC
Background Paper No. 1 § 6, at 11 (1973).
cental catch limitation are applicable only to that area within the
eastern Pacific Ocean known as the Commission's Yellowfin Regu-
latory Area (hereinafter referred to as the CYRA).85 As stated by
Craig J. Orange, a member of the scientific staff of the IATTC,
"[t] he fishery for tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean covers a rather
extensive geographic area and is engaged in by nationals from a
large number of countries. '3 6 In fact, the regulatory area within
which the IATTC operates and to which the convention applies con-
sists of 5,012,643 square nautical miles,3 7 extending from approxi-
mately San Francisco, California in the north, to the area of Val-
pariso, Chile in the south. 38 In the east, the regulatory area lies off
the coasts of twelve North, Central and South American nations.
Westwardly, the CYRA extends into the high seas in an area that is
about twice the size of the continental United States. The year 1973
is the only year in which there has been a change in the delinia-
tion of the CYRA.39
Even though research revealed that the CYRA could support an
annual catch of 91,000 tons40 the 1966 quota was set at 79,300
tons in order that stocks might be rebuilt to their optimum level.
41
To achieve the same result, the 1967 quota was set at 84,500 tons.
42
In 1968, the quota was initially 93,000 tons but later increased to
106,000 tons because favorable environmental conditions had caused
a temporary increase in the equilibrium yield.
43
It was during this two year period (1967-1968) that arguments
were being advanced that suggested that the scientific staff of the
Commission had been too conservative in estimating the maximum
sustainable yield. In light of these arguments the Commission, at
its meeting in 1968, requested that its scientific staff design an ex-
perimental program to achieve certainty in the Commission's un-
derstanding of the maximum sustainable yield from the yellowfin
fishery.4 4 Pursuant to this directive, the staff devised a three year
35. Area defined at the 15th Meeting of the IATTC in Quito, Ecuador
in May, 1962. See app. fig. 1.
36. 1971 IATTC Internal Rep. No. 6 (1971).
37. Id. at table 12.
38. 108 Cong. Rec. 21536 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1972) (statement by House
of Representatives Floor Leader Congressman Selden).
39. See app. fig. 2; see also 1972 IATTC Ann. Rep. 13, 16 (1973).
40. 1966 IATTC Ann. Rep. 6 (1967). (All tonnage in this article are
weighed as short tons.)
41. Id. at 51.
42. 1967 IATTC Ann. Rep. 57 (1968).
43. 1968 IATTC Ann. Rep. 7, 47 (1969).
44. See 1970 IATTC Ann. Rep. 36 (1971); 1972 IATTC Ann. Rep. 59
(1973); 1973 IATTC Background Paper No. 2, at 5 (1973).
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experimental program to begin in 1969. 4 5 In addition to this experi-
mental program, one other program of major significance was ini-
tiated in 1969. The program referred to was a one year special al-
locations program of 4,000 tons per country to be taken during the
closed season by vessels of a capacity of 300 tons or less.4 6 This
special allocation was created to grant the small vessels the needed
assistance in adjusting to the lengthened closed season.
In 1970, the Commission reaffirmed its desire to continue the ex-
perimental overfishing program by establishing a 120,000 ton quota
subject to the same contingency as in 1969. 47 The one year small
boat allowance was continued and became applicable to vessels with
a carrying capacity of up to 400 tons. The amount of this special
allowance was increased from 4,000 to 6,000 tons. Also in 1970, coun-
tries with tuna canning facilities were permitted to receive yellow-
fin landed during the closed season. Furthermore, in order not to
curtail their fisheries, countries whose yellowfin catches were not
"of significance" (less than 1,000 tons per year) were exempted
from compliance with the regulations.
48
In 1971, at the 25th Commission meeting in Mexico City, a quota
of 140,000 tons was established. The small vessel allocation that
was established in 1969, and that was to have lasted only one
year, continued at its 1970 level of 6,000 tons. In addition a 2,000
ton closed season allocation was granted to newly-constructed ves-
sels of member countries whose tuna fisheries were in certain pre-
scribed developing stages. Also continued was the 1,000 ton spe-
cial allotment to those countries whose canneries depended upon fish
throughout the year for their survival and growth.
49
Again, in 1972, the quota was set at 140,000 tons accompanied
by all of the previous special allocations. It was at this time that
45. See 1969 IATTC Ann. Rep. 34, 45 (1970); 1970 IATTC Ann. Rep.
36, 48 (1971); 1971 IATTC Ann. Rep. 8, 32, 46 (1972); 1972 IATTC Ann.
Rep. 59 (1973); 1973 IATTC Background Paper No. 2, at 5 (1973); 1973
IATTC Background Paper No. 3, at 5 (1973). This three year experimental
program allowed the quotas for the next three years to be set at 120,000
tons, subject to the condition that if the annual catch per standard day's
fishing should fall below three tons per day, the program would end and
the catch would be held at the then current level of sustainable yield.
46. 1969 IATTC Ann. Rep. 8, 46-47 (1970).
47. See note 45 supra.
48. 1970 IATTC Ann. Rep. 48-51 (1971).
49. 1971 IATTC Ann. Rep. 56-59 (1972).
the Commission elected to continue the experimental overfishing
program subject to the original contingency placed upon it in
1969.50
In 1973, in addition to allowing all of the previous special alloca-
tions, (and enlarging the new vessel allocation from 2,000 to 6,000
tons) the quota was set at an all-time high of 160,000 tons. The
enlargement of the quota was the result of studies indicating that
there had been no significant drop in the catch per standard day's
fishing.51
From the rather innocent appearing quota system just de-
scribed5 2 several significant problems may be perceived.
2. Problems Resulting from the Quota System
The first problem, and one that typically plagues governmental
bodies, concerns the economic funding of the organization. As to
the first sixteen years of the Commission's operations,
in only 2 years (FY 1958 and 1959) has the Commission's recom-
mended budget, and hence the program on which the budget was
based, been approved by all member governments. This means that
in only 2 years of the 16 has the full continuing program the
Commission thought necessary under its treaty mandate been car-
ried out. Even under these straited circumstances, the progress in
research by the Commission's staff has been quite good, but it has
never been enough to establish fully the basis of knowledge re-
quired to follow the rapidly changing and growing needs of the
fishery.... The accumulated pool of knowledge collected by the
staff during the past... years is growing dangerously shallow.
53
The reduced programs referred to were scientific ones such as tag-
ging.54
In 1966, the year in which the above statement was made, the
United States allocated $423,000.00 to the IATTC. By 1972, some
six years and several experimental programs later, the contribu-
tion from the United States had been increased by only $29,000. 55
50. 1972 IATTC Ann. Rep. 7-17 (1973); see also note 45 supra.
51. 1973 IATTC Background Paper No. 3, at 7 (1973).
52. See also app. fig. 9.
53. 1966 IATTC Ann. Rep. 43-44 (1967).
54. See note 25 supra. The reduced tagging effort that took place pri-
marily in the mid 1960's (but still not up to its desired level) has been
especially unfortunate since only intensive tagging, especially in offshore
areas, can yield the direct data necessary to define the population structure
of the yellowfin and skipjack tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean.
55. 1972 IATTC Ann. Rep. 18 (1973). Compare to the 1966 .ATTC Ann.
Rep. 45 (1967). For some insight as to why the IATTC has not been
able to receive increased amounts from the United States see John J.
Rooney's (Chairman of the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Ap-
propriations) report note 25, supra.
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The United States' contributions are given here for comparison
since they are by far the largest and because it is from these con-
tributions that the proportionate amount due from the other member
nations is determined.
The lack of proper funding is also indicative of what was re-
ferred to earlier as political control over a scientific organization.56
Further indicia of the same proposition was pointed out in 1961,
when the scientific staff recommended that a quota system be
adopted to preserve the yellowfin tuna. Annually, such a recom-
mendation was made, but until 1966, the member governments felt
that it was not "practical" for all countries to adopt appropriate
legislation.57 Once the quota system was firmly established and
serving its desired function, (as evidenced by the increase in catch
per standard day's fishing58 ) the governments began riddling it
with exceptions.59 A "one year" small boat exception was estab-
lished in 1969. In 1970, the small boat exception was not only con-
tinued but was expanded in both amount and size of vessels that
qualified. Also in 1970, another special exception was made to
"needy canneries." In 1971, in addition to the continuation of the
previous special allocations, a new exception of 2,000 tons was
created for new vessels of developing countries. During 1972, all
of the exceptions remained active at their 1971 levels. In 1973, the
only change to the special exceptions was that the 2,000 ton special
allocation to small vessels of developing nations was increased to
6,000 tons. The adoption of these special allocation programs was
motivated primarily by national economic interest. It was Mexi-
co which
concluded that such special allocation was necessary, because its
fleet, which was small in number and size, required freedom from
regulation to develop and compete with other fishing countries.
Mexico further added the argument that its cannery operations
needed fish throughout the year for survival and growth.30
56. See note 17 supra.
57. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text supra.
58. See note 26 supra; see also app. figs. 7, 8.
59. See notes 46, 48-51 and accompanying text supra. See also 1973
IATTC Background Paper No. 3, Table 1 (1973).
60. Review of the Yellowfin Tuna Conservation Programs Recom-
mended by the IATTC, 1966-1973, at 18 (1973), prepared for the House
of Representatives Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, Subcom-
mittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment, 93d
Congress 1st Sess. (May 10, 1973).
It was
[a]s a result of a special request by Mexico in 1971 and 1972, the
IATTC also adopted a special allocation for "newly constructed flag
vessels of those members of the Commission which are develop-
ing countries .... " Only Mexico was able to take advantage of
this special allocation in 1971 and 1972.61
In 1973, Mexico again was the only country to take advantage of the
program she originally proposed for newly constructed vessels.62
With the adoption of these special allocations, for the first time
since the IATTC was established, national economic interests out-
rank the international interests of conservation of the yellowfin
tuna. The alterations are highly discriminatory 63 and are directed
at the economy of the individual nations, and in particular Mexi-
co, rather than at the true goals of the IATTC. Why then are
these special allocations continued year after year? It is probable
that these special allocations are appeasements to Mexico so that
she will be less likely to enlarge her territorial sea boundaries to
200 miles.6 4 Such action would be unquestionably more detrimental
to other members' interests than the granting of additional spe-
cial allotments, since some of the prime fishing areas lie off Mexi-
co's coasts.6 5
In addition to the special allocations defeating the purpose of
the quota, there exists the problem of overfishing. Overfishing
existed before the experimental program of 1969. In fact, the quota
system was implemented in 1966, after annual recommendations
(since 1961) that a quota be established to alleviate the overfish-
ing problem.6  The Commission now claims that the catch per
61. Id. at 20.
62. Id. 1973 Supplement; see also The San Diego Evening Tribune, Dec.
9, 1973 at A-9, col. 1 for Mexico's 1974 proposal that she be exempt from
all quotas.
63. Only the United States fleet and part of the Canadian fleet were
subjected to the burdens of the regulatory system since every other nation
could qualify under some exception. Id. at 19.
64. The San Diego Union, July 16, 1973, at B-1, col. 1, quoting both
President Luis Echeverria Alvarez of Mexico and Hector Medina Neri, the
Undersecretary of Mexican Fisheries, espousing the support for a proposed
200 mile territorial limit.
65. See note 25 supra; see also app. figs. 3-6.
66. Other than examining app. fig. 9 and observing that the quotas have
been exceeded every year except 1971, the way to determine if there has
been overfishing is to compare catch per standard day's fishing [herein-
after referred to as CPSDF]. The CPSDF has ranged from a high of 7.98
in 1960 to a low of 2.94 in 1962. Recently the CPSDF has been about
6.0. 1971 and 1973 were both exceptions to this general statement since
both were in the 4.'s. See 1970 IATTC Ann. Rep. 38 (1971); 1972 IATTC
Ann. Rep. 28 (1973); 1973 IATTC Background Paper No. 2, at 3-7, 13, 14
(1973). See also app. figs. 7, 8.
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standard day's fishing (CPSDF) is approximately at its expected
level and that therefore overfishing is not a real problem. The
problem of overfishing does become apparent, however, when the
area that was fished in 1960 is compared to the area fished in more
recent years.67 In order to achieve the same CPSDF, the tuna
fishermen are now relying on more modern technology, larger
tuna seiners and a fishing area that is substantially larger than
what it was in the past.
REGULATIONS Am THEIR EFcTs
The protection of the high seas fishery resource can only be ac-
complished by concerted international action. Under the terms of
the convention, the governments of the member nations have
"agreed to enact such legislation as may be necessary to carry out
the purposes of this convention." 68 To varying degrees all IATTC
member countries have adopted restrictive legislation to carry out
the conservation recommendations of the Commission.
During the closed season, enforcement of restrictive legislation is
particularly necessary. This is due to the possible abuse of the 15
percent exemption6 9 for yellowfin tuna taken incidentally while
fishing for other species. Vessels that fish entirely within the
CYRA require only the inspection of their tuna unloadings (land-
ings) to determine whether the 15 percent incidental catch limi-
tation is exceeded. A more difficult problem exists with the con-
trol of the vessels that either fish entirely outside the regulatory
area or both within and without the regulatory area on the same
voyage. Vessels fishing outside the CYRA during the closed season
enjoy free fishing for yellowfin tuna. There exists the tempta-
tion for vessels to catch yellowfin tuna within the regulatory area
and then claim that the fish were caught outside the area, thus
subverting the 15 percent incidental catch limitation.70 To enforce
this limitation it is necessary, in addition to inspecting unloadings,
to know precisely where each vessel is operating. To avoid the
additional possibility of subverting the limitation by "dumping"
7' 1
67. See app. figs. 3-6.
68. IATTC supra note 1, art. MI, at 238.
69. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
70. 1973 IATTC Background Paper No. 2 at 6 (1973).
71. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
(and also to know the precise statistics of fish caught) a more elab-
orate system of data collection and communication with the fleet is
needed.72
A. Regulations on. the National Level
Presently the United States is the only nation that utilizes a high
seas monitoring program within the eastern Pacific Ocean tuna
fishery.73 Other member nations and non-member nations have not
seen fit to implement enforcement or regulatory systems equivalent
to those of the United States. The present system of special closed
season allocations 74 has effectively eliminated the need for Mexi-
co, Costa Rica, and Japan to be required to use a United States type
system to enforce their regulations since it in effect vitiates the
quota as to those countries. The present enforcement actions taken
by Canada and Panama make it possible for their flag vessels to
evade regulations. As a result of the denouncement action taken
by Ecuador in 1968, 75 and by making reference to the applicability
of the IATTC special allocations, no flag vessels of Ecuador need
be concerned about the IATTC. By refusing to join the IATTC
and by making reference to the special allocations, the flag vessels
of Bermuda, Peru, Chile and Cuba can avoid regulations, thus un-
dercutting the effectiveness of the conservation programs.
Beginning in 1969, and strengthened since, vessel reporting re-
quirements with long-range aerial and oceanic patrols coupled with
other means of surveillance, have enabled the United States to ef-
fectively monitor and largely control activities of its tuna fleet.
To be assured that the overall small boat allotment (6,000 tons)
is not exceeded, the United States maintains cummulative yellowfin
tuna catch statistics. Tuna boat unloadings are routinely inspected
to see that the small boat allocation and the 15 percent incidental
catch limitation are not exceeded. The United States also has
penalty provisions that are sufficiently severe to act as effective
deterrents for potential violations. This is not to say that violations
have not or will not take place, but when the violators have been
apprehended they have been vigorously prosecuted.7 6
72. See 1966 IATTC Ann. Rep. 13, 14 (1966).
73. 1971 Intergovernmental Conference on the Conservation of Yellow-
fin Tuna Rep. from sub-group three, National Regulatory and Enforcement
Systems, to the Working Group on the Regulatory System for Yellowfin
Tuna, La Jolla, California, November 9-10, 1971, at 12-20 (1971). [Here-
inafter cited as 1971 IGCCYT Rep. on Regulatory and Enforcement Sys-
tems.]
74. See notes 46, 48-51, 59 and accompanying texts supra.
75. 1968 IATTC Ann. Rep. 47 (1969).
76. 1971 IGCCYT Rep. on Regulatory and Enforcement Systems at 20
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Canada has recognized the need to monitor the activities of its
large vessels and is considering placing fishery inspectors aboard
each boat to prevent the 15 percent incidental yellowfin catch limi-
tation from being deliberately exceeded during the closed fishing
season. Like the United States, Canada routinely inspects the un-
loading of all its tuna vessels in its own ports during the closed
season and has provided penalties for anyone caught violating its
tuna conservation regulations. The maximum fine is considerably
less than that of the United States and to date has never been im-
posed despite the fact that violations have been substantiated by
United States aerial photographs. 7
High seas monitoring, surveillance and enforcement have not been
developed as yet by the Japanese. However, Japan is planning
to build an inspection vessel to monitor its fishing fleet within the
regulatory area. Japan also has provisions that require vessels to
report when operating within the CYRA and when departing from
the area. The amount and species of fish caught within the CYRA
must also be telegraphed to the Japanese Fisheries Agency. Gov-
ernment officials periodically check tuna vessels to make sure that
the incidental catch limitations for yellowfin tuna are not ex-
ceeded. The maximum penalty for violations is even less than that
of Canada, but additionally there are provisions for imprisonment.
Here again, these penalties have never been imposed.78
As France and Nicaragua have only recently become members
of the IATTC, information is not yet available regarding their pro-
posed regulations and enforcement measures.
The remaining member nations have instituted neither the re-
porting requirements for vessels at sea, nor provisions for high seas
monitoring.7 9 In the past these countries have considered high seas
monitoring unnecessary because their tuna vessels were incapable
(1971); see also Tuna Fleet Sues U.S. in Effort to Block Curbs on Yellow-
fin, San Diego Evening Tribune, July 26, 1973, in which it was pointed
out that to that date the United States government had confiscated twelve
cargos, involving a forfeiture of over $750,000 from United States tunaboats
which had illegally fished in the conservation zone.
77. United States v. Approx. 485, 856 tons of Yellowfin Tuna (C.D. Calif.
Case No. 70-2707, 1971). See Answer to Interrogatories at 4, May 11, 1971.
78. 1971 IGCCYT Rep. on Regulatory and Enforcement Systems 12-20
(1971).
79. Id.
of operating outside of the CYRA. The larger tuna seiners that
these nations have recently acquired do have the capacity to fish
both inside and outside the CYRA. 80 All of these remaining mem-
ber nations also have provided for penalties in varying sizes, but
as the case has been with all other nations, except the United States,
these nations have not recognized violations by their own vessels
and therefore, they have neither prosecuted nor imposed penal-
ties.8 '
The penalty regulations of the member nations are considerably
different from each other; similarity can be found in the unimpres-
sive lack of investigations of alleged violations by foreign fishing
vessels. In the United States however, the Code of Federal Regula-
tions prescribes a system of timely investigations by the Director
of the National Marine Fishery Service
as may be necessary to keep himself and other persons concerned
currently informed regarding the nature and effectiveness of the
measures for the implementation of the Commission's recommen-
dations which are being carried out by countries whose vessels en-
gage in fishing within the regulatory area.82
Since 1966, the American Tunaboat Association has requested in-
vestigations in the manner prescribed by these regulations. The
alleged violations that the American Tunaboat Association has de-
sired to have investigated have involved Mexican vessels in 1967
and 1968, Canadian vessels in 1970 and 1972, and Spanish vessels in
1973.83 The investigations initiated by the American Tunaboat
Association and those initiated by the United States government
against its own vessels may be the only investigations that have
been undertaken. Furthermore, the United States is the only na-
tion which has prosecuted and fined its own citizens for violating
tuna conservation regulations.84
B. Effects of Unequal Regulations
Unilateral enforcement of fisheries regulations by the United
80. See Development of Foreign Tuna Fishing Fleets in the Eastern Pa-
cific-Transfer of former U.S. Flag Tuna Vessels Relationship-1957-1973
Prepared for Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and En-
vironment by the American Tunaboat Association. May 16, 1963; see also
app. figs. 3-6 illustrating the expanded use of the area beyond the CYRA.
81. 1971 IGCCYT Rep. on Regulatory and Enforcement Systems at 20
(1971).
82. 50 C.F.R. § 281.5 (a); see also 50 C.F.R. § 201.1.
83. Statement before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Con-
servation and the Environment by the American Tunaboat Association.
May 16, 1973, at 4, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (1973).
84. 1971 IGCCYT Rep. on Regulatory and Enforcement Systems at 20
(1971). See also San Diego Evening Tribune, Dec. 16, 1973, § B-13 col.
1.
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States is neither fair nor ultimately successful in conserving the
fishery.8 5 Additionally, it has led to substantial animosity by United
States tuna fishermen towards their foreign counterparts. They
feel that they are being discriminately burdened by both the spe-
cial allotments established by the IATTC and by the regulations
that either do not exist or are not enforced by the other member
nations.8 6 It seems likely that as a result of this feeling of dis-
crimination, international repercussions are now being felt or soon
will be felt by all nations who are members of the IATTC. Two
of the more direct and proximate results of the promulgation, en-
forcement and threatened enforcement of the United States regula-
tions against its own fishermen, while the other nations remain
idle, are: (1) United States registered tuna fishing vessels are in-
creasingly changing their registry to foreign nations, 7 and (2)
the present suit to enjoin the enforcement of these regulations and
to embargo the entry of fish goods from those nations which are
violating the conservation efforts of the IATTC.88
1. Changing Flags
The pattern for circumventing the IATTC management program
has already been clearly established. The circumvention is accom-
plished by changing flags and thereby removing the vessels, mas-
ters and crews from the enforcement of stringent U.S. regulations.
The United States has between 130 and 200 tuna vessels operating
within the CYRA this year;8 9 the country has lost an additional 32
85. See National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere 2d
Ann. Rep. to the President and the Congress, at 43, issued on June 29,
1973 in Washington, D.C. (1973).
86. Statement by Raymond F. Zvetina, attorney for the plaintiffs in the
action American Tunaboat Association v. Dent (S.D. Calif. Case No. 73-
299, filed July 26, 1973).
87. See note 80 supra; Sept.-Oct. 1973 Bi-Monthly IATTC Rep. 5 (1973);
see also San Diego Evening Tribune, July 26, 1973, B-5, col. 1.
88. See American Tunaboat Association v. Dent, note 2 supra. Such an
embargo is provided in 22 U.S.C. § 1978. See TnE FrsHEnwmN's PROTECTIV
ACT, as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971); and TUNA CON-
VE=qTIONS ACT OF 1950 as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 951 et seq., at § 955(c);
Pub. L. No. 87-814, § 1, 76 Stat. 923. See also 50 C.F.R. § 280 et seq.
for regulations adopted pursuant to the Tuna Conventions Act of 1950, as
amended.
89. See The San Diego Evening Tribune, December 8, 1973, A-4, col. 5;
see also Sept.-Oct. 1973 Bi-Monthly IATTC Rep. 5 (1973). The United
States has other tuna vessels that are presently fishing in other parts of
vessels in recent years as a result of flag changes.90 According to
recent reports even more vessels have been sold to foreign
fishing interests.91 Of the thirty vessels that compromise the Mex-
ican tuna fleet, twenty-three are former U.S. vessels. The Costa
Rican fleet consists of nine vessels, six of which changed flags
from the United States to Costa Rica. Three of the six vessels that
operate under the Panamanian flag are former United States ves-
sels.02
The benefits of this foreign flag operation to the individual tuna-
boat owner are obvious. During the closed season, when the U.S.
tuna fleet is forced to leave the CYRA, the foreign flag vessels have
the area practically to themselves. This, plus the increasing value
of frozen tuna in the world tuna markets, makes the change of flags
very appealing. The detriments of such an operation to the in-
dividual tunaboat owner are very limited. The cost of trans-ship-
ment to the United States' ports presents no problem and it would
even be possible for such vessels to land directly in American
Samoa and other possessions whenever it was convenient. This is
possible because the Nicholson Act,93 which deals with the regula-
tion of vessels in domestic commerce, applies only to "a port of the
United States" and not its possessions. The loss of protection
under the Fishermen's Protective Act of 196794 is a serious detri-
ment since fishermen operating under a foreign flag, who are appre-
hended within another foreign nation's expanded boundaries would
have to pay their own fines rather than the United States govern-
ment paying them. This detriment could be avoided by purchas-
ing fishing licenses from the nations that have enlarged bound-
aries. It also could be avoided by fishing in the areas of prime yel-
lowfin abundance which are located well above those nations which
have already enacted such boundaries. 95 Even if Mexico were to
enact an extended boundary in order to capitalize on the dominant
location of the resource, it most likely would be possible to change
to a Mexican flag or obtain a Mexican license. By avoiding the
IATTC conservation program and fishing within the CYRA on a
year round basis under the foreign flag of a nation with extended
the world. The 1972 IATTC Ann. Rep. 27 (1973), stated that the number
of vessels from all nations that have fished within the CYRA has increased
from 253 in 1965 to 373 in 1972.
90. See note 80 supra.
91. See note 87 supra.
92. See note 80 supra.
93. 46 U.S.C. §§ 251-252.
94. 22 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1978 (1972), FnsHEm's PnoTscTv AcT OF 1967,
as amended, Pub. L. No. 92-569, § 3, 86 Stat. 1182, October 26, 1972.
95. See note 25 supra and accompanying text; see also app. figs. 3-6.
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boundaries, it would be possible to fish exclusively for yellowfin
tuna and also avoid the 200 mile problem.
The avoidance of the IATTC conservation recommendations and
the United States regulations by "changing flag" already has af-
fected adversely the morale of the entire United States tropical
tuna fishing fleet. It has created increased hostility and resent-
ment towards those fishermen who have either changed flags or are
merely continuing to fish under the flag of a nation which either
does not have regulations, or, if it has them, fails to enforce them.
Changing flag also poses a threat to the fishermen's continued vol-
untary compliance with the conservation objectives of the IATTC.
This voluntary compliance is necessary since, even though the
United States does have strict enforcement, it would be impossible
to control an area the size of the CYRA without some sort of volun-
tary compliance. Also, those complying with the regulations feel it
is in their own best interests to report any suspected violations.90
Nationally, the United States has been economically damaged by
this flag changing. Not only have many vessels, masters and crews
been devoting their talent to foreign nations' tuna industries, but
also the United States has been forced to increase the import of
tuna products from aboard. The value of these tuna imports has
increased from $97,235,980 in 1969, to $219,302,103 in 1972, 9 7 rep-
resenting an increase of over $120,000,000 within a four year period.
Internationally, the repercussions of flag changing are far more
serious. Approximately 70 percent or more of the tuna caught
within the CYRA at the present time is caught by American flag
vessels.98 These vessels are subject to the stringent regulations that
are strictly enforced by the United States government. When they
change flag they are no longer responsible to the United States
government or its regulations. With an increasing number of ves-
sels fishing under the flags of foreign nations which are lax on
the implementation or enforcement of the conservation recommen-
96. See note 83 supra and accompanying text.
97. U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Imports-General and Consumption,
Schedule A commodity and country, Rpts. Ft. 135-72-12 (1972); Ft. 135-
71-12 (1971); Ft. 135-70-12 (1970); Ft. 135-69-12 (1969). See also Canned
Fishery, Products, Annual Summaries, Current Fisheries Statistics (C.F.S.)
No. 6101 (1972); C.F.S. No. 5901 (1971); C.F.S. No. 2862 (1961); C.F.S.
No. 1517 (1951) and C.F.S. No. 497 (1941).
98. See 1973 IATTC Background Paper No. 1, at 9-10 (1973).
dations, a proportionate increase in the number of violations of the
IATTC's recommendations is most likely to occur. The more viola-
tions, the more probable it is that the "concerted effort" to save the
resources of the sea will fail. With the failure of the conservation of
the yellowfin and skipjack tuna lies the decline of the Inter-Ameri-
can Tropical Tuna Commission, a once viable and promising or-
ganization whose international interests were to have superseded
the individual national interests.
Failure of the IATTC and more importantly, the principles for
which it stands, may foretell the future for other international or-
ganizations. One repercussion might be an immediate attempt by
most nations involved to protect their tuna industries from the en-
suring "free-for-all" by establishing a 200 mile territorial bound-
ary. A second effect could be the failure of the Atlantic Tuna
Commission, an international organization consisting of many of
the same nations and espousing principles similar to those of the
IATTC. In turn, when so many international treaties and agree-
ments are being either dissolved or drastically modified in pursuit of
national interests, there is little to assure that any international
agreement will be recognized.
2. A Suit to Enjoin the Enforcement of the United States Regula-
tions
As previously indicated, the second major result of the discrep-
ancy between the stringent United States regulations and the lax
foreign regulations is the possibility of a judgment for the plaintiffs
in the recently filed action of American Tunaboat Association v.
Dent"0 . The plaintiffs in this action are seeking the implementa-
tion of the embargo provisions of the Tuna Conventions Act. 00
They are also seeking to enjoin the Secretary of Commerce'0 1 from
enforcing any regulation prior to an agreed date for the applica-
tion of effective measures for the implementation of the IATTC
recommendations by all nations whose vessels engage in yellowfin
tuna fishing within the CYRA/ on a meaningful scale.102 The
99. S.D. Calif. Case No. 73-299, filed July 26, 1973.
100. TUNA CoNvmE oNs ACT OF 1950 as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 951 et
seq. at § 955(c). Pub. L. 87-814, § 1, 76 Stat. 923, see also 50 C.F.R. §§
280, 281 et seq. for regulations adopted pursuant to the TuNA CoNvzEioNs
ACT OF 1950 as amended. See also embargo provisions of the F sasmvmN's
PROTECTrvE AcT as amended in 1971, 22 U.S.C. § 1978, Pub. L. No. 92-219,
85 Stat. 786 (1971).
101. See Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15627 (1970).
The functions of the Department of the Interior under the Tuna Conven-
tions Act were transferred to the Department of Commerce.
102. TuNA CONVENTIONs ACT oF 1950, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 951 et
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following excerpts may indicate the true intent of the statute and
of Congress in enacting such legislation.
The United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica con-
sidering their mutual interest in maintaining the populations of
yellowfin and skipjack tuna ... and desiring to cooperate ...
have to conclude a convention for these purposes .... 303
This should indicate the obvious intention that the conservation of
the species was to be a joint effort.
The committee, however, is sympathetic to the understandable
concern of the industry that the bill could result in restrictions on
the American fishing industry while nationals of other countries
would be free to exploit the resource without restraint The bill,
as amended by the committee, is carefully tailored to insure that
restrictions are applied fairly and equitably to all who use the
tropical tuna resources of the Eastern Pacific. Restrictions, un-
der the bill, could not be applied to Americans until comparable
restrictions were applied by other interested countries to their fish-
ermen. The embargo provisions of the bill, would deny entry
into the United States of fish subject to regulation which were
caught under circumstances that would defeat or diminish the ef-
fectiveness of the conservation recommendations of the committee
(sic), provide additional incentives in this respect. They are in-
tended to remove any possibility that the lucrative market in the
United States for tuna will encourage fishermen of other coun-
tries to operate in a manner that will defeat the purpose of the
conservation program.' 04
This committee report expresses the equally obvious intention
that United States fishermen should not be subjected to restric-
tions that do not exist for all other tuna fishermen and also that
the United States should prohibit the importation of fish that are
caught in a manner that would defeat or diminish the purpose of
the IATTC's conservation program.
The early regulations issued by the Secretary in 1962, 1964 and
1966105 contained the specific language that those regulations regard-
ing tuna fishing would not take effect until such time as agree-
ment had been reached with the several countries whose fishermen
seq. at § 966(c). Pub. L. No. 87-814, § 1, 76 Stat. 923, see also 50 C.F.R.
§ 280, 281 et seq. for regulations adopted pursuant to the TUNA CoNV'N-
TIONS ACT OF 1950 as amended.
103. IATTC, supra note 1, preamble (emphasis added).
104. S. Commerce Comm. Rep. No. 1737, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962)
(emphasis added).
105. 27 Fed. Reg. 10221 (1962); 29 Fed. Reg. 6158 (1964); 31 Fed. Reg.
7516 (1966).
participate in the regulated tuna fisheries "for the simultaneous ap-
plication by all such countries of suitable conservation measures
to be observed by their fishing vessels." The more recent regula-
tions do not contain this provision.
It is apparent that originally even the Secretary of the Interior
felt that the implementation of the United States regulations was
dependent on the satisfaction of a condition precedent, namely the
adoption of equivalent conservation measures by all other mem-
ber nations.100
It would appear from the Tuna Conventions Act of 1950,107 the
legislation that has stemmed from it, and the legislative history of
both, that the obvious intent of Congress was that:
(1) the conservation efforts were to be accomplished by mutual
cooperation;
(2) the regulations and enforcement thereof were to be nondis-
criminatory;
(3) prior to the effectuation of the United States regulations the
other member nations were to have equivalently effective regula-
tions, and;
(4) when foreign fishing operations within the CYRA are in vio-
lation of the conservation objectives of the IATTC their fish prod-
ucts are to be denied entry into the United States.
It is the position of the plaintiffs in the case under considera-
tion, that the obvious intent of Congress is as above. Assuming,
arguendo, that such an interpretation of Congressional intent is cor-
rect and that the plaintiffs are successful in gaining implementa-
tion of the embargo provisions -and/or an order enjoining the en-
forcement of the United States regulations, what will the result
be?
If the embargo provisions are enacted, those nations whose ves-
sels fish for tuna within the CYRA in a manner that is inconsis-
tent with the conservation recommendations of the IATTC will be
106. Further substantiation that the conservation activities were to be
cooperative ones accomplished in a nondiscriminatory fashion can be
drawn from the following:
The committee expects that the Secretary of the Interior, in ad-
ministering this legislation, would seek to implement the conserva-
tion objectives of the commission through cooperative interna-
tional efforts, without discriminating against vessels and persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. We are confident
that both the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of State
share the committee's dual objectives: an effective conservation
program aimed at producing the maximum sustained yield from
the resource, and a healthy, strong American industry. S. Com-
merce Comm. Rep. No. 1737, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) (emphasis
added).
107. TuNA CONVENTIONs ACT or 1950, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 951 et
seq.
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prohibited from exporting their fish goods to the United States.
According to Gerald Howard, the Regional Director of the Na-
tional Marine Fisheries Service, 108 the result would be that the af-
fected nations would seek new markets to sell their tuna. 0 9 Such
markets are available in both Japan and Europe.110 On the other
hand, if the United States embargos all fish goods"' from those
nations violating the international fisheries conservation programs
the result would be that the economics of those nations involved
would be adversely affected since the markets for all kinds of fish
goods are not as great as the markets for tuna.1 2 In any event,
even if markets were available to absorb all of the fish that the
United States refused to import, they would only be substitute
markets and not markets that would require increased fishing. It
may be however, that when the foreign nations realize that the
United States will not import either tuna or all fish goods, they
will begin to enforce their own regulations, or at least the IATTC's
recommendations, in order to regain the lucrative market pro-
vided by the United States.
The other possible result of a favorable judgment for the plain-
tiffs would be that the Secretary of Commerce would be enjoined
from effectuating the United States regulations until all other na-
tions, whose vessels fished within the CYRA, had adopted equiva-
lent regulations. Such a judgment would be either the death blow
to the already dying IATTC, or would have the beneficial result
of forcing implementation of its conservation recommendations.
108. This information was revealed to the author of this article in a
telephone conversation of November 21, 1973. It should be noted also that
Gerald Howard is a defendant in American Tunaboat Association v. Dent,
supra note 2.
109. Pursuant to the embargo provisions of the TuNA CONVENMTIONS ACT
or 1950 as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 951 et seq. at § 955 (c). Pub. L. No. 87-
814, § 1, 76 Stat. 923; see also 50 C.F.R. §§ 280, 281 et seq.
110. See 1966 IATTC Ann. Rep. 6 (1967); also stated by Gerald Howard
in the conversation of November 21, 1973, supra note 108. Additionally,
Mr. Howard stated that during the course of investigating Spanish viola-
tions in 1973, it was discovered that tuna fishermen could sell their catch
for almost twice the price if they sold it to Italian interests rather than
domestic United States interests.
111. See the embargo provisions of the FnsHmz='s PROTECMVE ACT,
supra note 88.
112. This was stated by both a reliable source within the IATTC and
Gerald Howard, supra note 108. Mr. Howard also stated that it is very
unlikely that such an embargo would be implemented since it requires
Presidential certification.
Every nation could conceivably fish for yellowfin tuna within the
CYRA all year long. This would create a "free-for-all" which in
turn quite obviously lead to the depletion of the yellowfin tuna
stock. Insofar as no one would be concerned about the conserva-
tion of the yellowfin tuna in the eastern Pacific Ocean, there would
exist no need for the continuation of the IATTC.
Conversely, if all of the member nations did adopt regulations,
this would show a continued international concern for the preserva-
tion of our limited marine resources. A showing of superiority of
international conservation interest over the individual nations'
economic interests would elevate the principles for which the
IATTC stands. It would illustrate that international cooperation
is possible in the field of resource conservation and that such in-




The success of the IATTC has depended and always will depend
upon international concerted action.113 In light of the problems
that have been suggested and the need of multilateral action to
solve these problems, the IATTC should form an international
committee of scientists. This committee should have an equal
number of representatives from every member nation. The pur-
pose of such a committee would be to promulgate enforcement
measures and regularly issue reports on the effectiveness of the
regulatory and enforcement systems so that problems might be
rectified by the adoption of improvements. If such a working com-
mittee could be established, the need to have an Intergovernmen-
tal Conference immediately following the IATTC's meetings would
be eliminated. The elimination of this political meeting is neces-
sary to reduce the political reins now controlling the IATTC.
The funding of the IATTC should be determined by the above
113. That such has been lacking is evidenced by the problem discussed
in the preceeding sections, namely (1) increased political control over a
scientific oriented organization; (2) the economic funding of the IATTC
being so minimal that many vital scientific programs have either been
reduced or eliminated; (3) the continual increase of quotas far beyond
the level of fishing that originally created the need for implementing a
quota system; (4) the establishment of discriminatory special allotments,
and; (5) the lack of enforcement of regulations that all member nations
were to adopt in order to achieve the goals of the IATTC. (This last
problem really consists of several problems, namely: the failure to adopt
regulations, failure to enforce regulations adopted and finally the discrep-
ancy of enforcement of adopted regulations.)
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mentioned committee. It should remain basically the same, with
each member nation paying an amount that is proportionate to its
catch for the previous year.114 In addition, all fines should be
paid directly to the IATTC rather than to the individual nations'
governments. Every vessel that fishes within the IATTC's regu-
latory zone also should pay a nominal proportionate registration
fee to cover part of the costs of the organization.
The quotas should be reduced until enough accurate scientific
information can be gathered to determine the amount of tuna that
can be removed without permanently decreasing the size of the
stock. This would mean increased scientific experimentation and
decreased fishing for the next several years.
The next step that needs to be taken is the abolishment of all
special allotments. If the nations desire to establish a minimal guar-
anteed catch for every nation, the IATTC could establish a quota
equal to what the maximum sustainable yield would permit less
6,000 tons per member nation. When this quota has been caught
and the season declared closed, the IATTC could then designate
an additional period of time during which each nation would be
allowed to catch its guaranteed allotment. Following the time in
which the nations are allowed to land their guaranteed catch, the
traditional 15 percent incidental catch limitation for yellowfin
tuna should become applicable for the closed season.
Even if all of these suggestions were incorporated within the
IATTC, there is still one problem remaining to be solved that can
be considered the key to success for the conservation of the yellow-
fin tuna within the eastern Pacific Ocean and in turn, the preserva-
tion of the IATTC. What is needed most is the adoption and ef-
fective implementation of regulations regarding the conservation of
the yellowfin tuna. Rather than allowing one nation to establish
an impossible standard for the other nations to follow, it would
be better if the committee previously suggested, would issue uni-
form regulations for every nation to ratify. Assuming that every
nation ratifies such regulations, the IATTC is still left with the sec-
ond half of the problem-enforcement. Rather than continue allow-
ing the individual nations to enforce the regulations against their
own vessels, it is suggested that an enforcement agency be estab-
1
114. For a further discussion on funding see note 25 supra.
lished within the IATTC. This agency should also be comprised
of an equal number of representatives from each nation. An in-
ternational enforcement agency analogous to a United Nations
peace-keeping force should insure a more equitable enforcement of
the regulations. In any event, enforcement could not be less equit-
able than it currently is.
The effects of such a proposal are obvious. Representatives from
every participating nation would inspect every other nation's ves-
sels to make sure that their fishermen had accurately recorded
their catch and had not violated any regulations. This in turn
would likely lead to more accurate records and fewer violations
since the fishermen would know that they would be subjected to a
higher degree of scrutinization.
These suggestions concerning the previously mentioned problems
are by no means complete. Many of the existing functions, duties
and recommendations of the IATTC are adequate and should be
maintained as are some of the regulations and enforcement provi-
sions of various nations. Some of the more basic problems and
solutions have been mentioned to show that a concerted effort could
revive the IATTC's efforts in maintaining the conservation of the
yellowfin and skipjack tuna without adversely affecting national
economics. The following are some of the more specific programs
that should be implemented by the proposed regulatory and en-
forcement committee:
(1) As a prerequisite for the accomplishment of the IATTC's
goals, the establishment of an effective high seas monitoring pro-
gram is mandatory. The use of ships, aircraft and space satellite
would be helpful in precisely transmitting and recording vital in-
formation regarding the location of fishing vessels and the gather-
ing of marine resource scientific data.
a. Having a small fleet of IATTC enforcement vessels would be
economically burdensome yet individfual enforcement would be
more costly since many of the efforts would be duplicated. If
the number of ships used was equivalent to the number already
being deployed by the member nations, the burden of operating
and maintaining these vessels would be absorbed by all of the
nations instead of one or two. With the use of the IATTC in-
spection craft, it would be possible to inspect the cargo holds of
those vessels who desire to fish both within and without the
CYRA on the same voyage. The inspection could be mandatory
before changing areas. This in itself would substantially reduce
the temptation to fish within the CYRA and claim that the tuna
had been caught outside the regulatory area (which allows
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nations to avoid both the 15 percent incidental catch limitation
and the conservation recommendations of the IATTC.)
b. The aircraft presently being utilized by the United States could
be used on a similar basis to detect violators. The aircraft would
know the locations of the fishing vessels which had reported
their positions as required and could therefore easily detect those
vessels which had not reported or had reported fasely. This
facilitation in the detection and apprehension of violators would
serve as a useful tool but when coupled with the additional
utility factor of gathering scientific data for the entire area, the
use of aerial patrols seems to be invaluable.
c. The space satellite utility could be focused in two key areas.
First, it could be used to relay all radio signals from the fishing
vessels and both the enforcement vessels and the enforcement
aircraft to a central IAATC office. The inclusion of fixed posi-
tions for fishing vessels, catch statistics from the inspection ves-
sels, and the locations of potential violators from the aircraft
would avoid much of the duplication of efforts that presently
takes place and would therefore save the IATTC some expense.
The central IATTC radio office in conjunction with the space
satellite would be infinitely more efficient than the individual
nation's radio stations. The second function already has been
emplemented by weather satellites to locate resources, detect
weather changes and photograph entire areas the size of the
IATTC.11 5
(2) The second mandatory prerequisite for the accomplishment
of the LtATTC's goals would be the establishment of an efficient
system of port inspection. The inspection of the unloading of all
vessels that had fished within the CYRA would be necessary during
both the open and closed seasons. This inspection would allow the
IATTC to properly record the exact amount of tuna caught for the
year by each nation and also would guaranty that the incidental
115. Such a use of satellites has been suggested by the IATTC and is
now under consideration. See Sept.-Oct. 1973 Bi-Monthly IATTC Rep. 13
(1973). The suggestion of using the satellite for both physical surveillance
and radio-reporting was also suggested; see National Advisory Committee
on Oceans and Atmosphere 2d Ann. Rep. to the President and the Congress
at 43, issued on June 29, 1973 in Washington, D.C. (1973). The IATTC
has used satellites in the past. See July-August 1973 Bi-Monthly IATTC
Ann. Rep. 48-51 (1973) and; 1971 IATTC Ann. Rep. 29-32 (1972).
catch limitations had not been exceeded without detection.
Regardless of how equitable the regulations are, there will al-
ways exist the temptation for some to violate them. As an added
enforcement provision, the regulation committee could also adopt
a mutually agreeable series of penalty provisions that are suffi-
ciently severe to act as an effective deterrent for those who con-
sider violating the IATTC's conservation efforts. For even greater
success all nations which fish within the CYRA should be encour-
aged to become members of the IATTC. If a nation fails to do so,
in the interests of international preservation of marine resources,
economic pressure in the form of an embargo by all member na-
tions should be initiated and sustained against the non-member un-
til it complies with the regulations.
IV
CONCLUSION
The management of our ocean's resources can succeed if a species
approach is established by a concerted effort of all nations. Hope-
fully, such an approach would assure rational utilization and con-
servation of all fish stocks within the CYRA. In the past, nations
have failed to cooperate with each other in the adoption and im-
plementation of uniform conservation regulations. The IATTC
with some modification could promulgate and enforce such meas-
ures in an equitable manner. This is only possible if the nations
involved are willing to restrain their national interests for the ac-
complishment of international goals. Even with American Tuna-
boat Association v. Dent"16 challenging the status quo, it is
doubtful that the nations involved will adopt a system of regula-
tions and enforcement similar to those of the United States. It is
possible however, since economics forced the creation of the
IATTC,117 and it was economics that subverted the Commission's
goals,"18 that it will be the economic effects of a potential em-
bargo" 9 that will give new life to the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission.
The importance of the continuation of the IATTC goes far be-
yond the conservation of yellowfin tuna. It now stands as repre-
sentative of all international conservation organizations in a very
real test of their viability. The international preservation of the
116. See note 2 supra.
117. See note 10 and accompanying text supra.
118. See notes 60, 61, 62 and accompanying text supra.
119. See note 112 and accompanying text supra.
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high seas resources could well depend upon the preservation of the
IATTC. If the IATTC is made subservient to national interests
there would exist a precedent upon which nation members of other
such organizations could rely in defeating international conserva-
tion efforts. On the other hand, if the IATTC does succeed in
organizing a cooperative effort to preserve our marine resources,
the impact of such a success could spread to all international or-




As this article was being completed two significant events trans-
pired. One of these events was that for the first time since the
quota system was established, the members of the IATTC were un-
able to stipulate to a mutually agreeable quota. As a result of this
lack of agreement when the open season began on January 1, 1974,
there was no quota in effect. It was the national interests of
Mexico that prohibited such an agreement. Rather than relying on
the hardship rationale which in the past had led to substantial
special allotments for Mexico, she now is seeking a system of guar-
anteed catch without regard for IATTC regulations.120 Finally, on
March 13, 1974, a quota was enacted. 21
The second event was that when the open season began, most
U.S. tuna boats did not sail. This was because the cannaries re-
fused to pay the boat owners the "world price" for tuna. U.S.
vessels supplying tuna to Italian interests were receiving $675 per
ton while American cannaries were not willing to go beyond the
$560 level. 122 The result of this dispute is two-fold. First it creates
greater economic pressure to fish for foreign tuna interests, and sec-
ond the possible adverse effect of not having a quota may be
avoided. Since the tuna seiners that catch the majority of fish
are in port, there is no overfishing.
120. See San Diego Evening Tribune Dec. 11, 1973, § A-10, col. 1, for
statement regarding pressure exerted upon the United States fishing inter-
ests to agree to Mexico's proposal.
121. See San Diego Evening Tribune Mar. 13, 1974, § B-5, col. 1.
122. See San Diego Evening Tribune Dec. 28, 1973, § A-12, col. 5;
San Diego Evening Tribune Jan. 1, 1974, § A-2 col. 4; San Diego Evening
Tribune Jan. 3, 1974, § A-2 col. 3; San Diego Evening Tribune Jan. 7, 1974,
§ A-1, col. 1.
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